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It is a widely established hypothesis that populism in the media affects media users (Aalberg, 
Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & 
Stanyer, 2018). However, most empirical studies have focused on attitudinal effects (Bos, van 
der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011, 2013; Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017, 2018; Hameleers & 
Schmuck, 2017; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017). It remains an open question if populism in the 
media may also induce populist behavior, such as the expression of populist ideology in 
public discourse. We know that the use of uncivil media may lead to an increased use of 
incivility in political expressions (Gervais, 2014), but we do not know if this finding from 
incivility research can also be applied to the area of populist communication.  
Previous research has shown that populist communication can influence populist 
attitudes (e.g., Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Müller et al., 2017), attitudes towards migrants 
(e.g., Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Wirz et al., 2018), emotions (Wirz, 2018b; Wirz et al., 
2018), the perception of political actors (e.g., Bos et al., 2013), voting behavior (e.g., Sheets, 
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Bos, & Boomgaarden, 2016), and political engagement (e.g., Hameleers, Bos, Fawzi et al., 
2018). These studies have mostly relied on experimental settings, while empirical studies 
under real-life conditions are scarce (rare exceptions: Bos et al., 2013; Müller et al., 2017; 
Wirz et al., 2018). Most of these experiments measured only planned and not manifest 
behavior. However, because planned behavior may be influenced by social desirability, past 
behavior, and anticipated emotions, it is often only an inaccurate approach to actual behavior 
(Armitage & Conner, 2001; Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001). More recently, research has also 
started to analyze effects of populist communication on user reactions on social media, 
relying on content analysis instead of surveys or experiments (Blassnig, Ernst, Engesser, & 
Esser, forthcoming; Bobba, 2018). This approach using digital trace data (Howison, Wiggins, 
& Crowston, 2011) has the advantage of a higher external validity. This is specifically 
relevant with regard to populist communication; in an artificial experimental situation, 
citizens may be more hesitant to express populist messages due to social desirability.  
To narrow this substantive and methodological gap in the research, we pursue the 
question of how populist online news influences the number and content of reader comments. 
Reader comments are a particularly worthwhile object of investigation because of their dual 
nature. They can be regarded not only as an expression of communication behavior but may 
also influence other readers (e.g., Lee, 2012; e.g., Lee & Jang, 2010; Zerback & Fawzi, 2016). 
Furthermore, by focusing on online news, we can investigate populist statements by three key 
groups of actors – politicians, the media, and citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018) – and their 
interactions within the same platform. 
We follow a communication-centered approach (de Vreese et al., 2018; Stanyer, 
Salgado, & Strömbäck, 2017) and conceptualize populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (Hawkins, 
Carlin, Littvay, & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Mudde, 2004) that political actors, journalists, 
and citizens can express via specific populist key messages (Blassnig, Ernst, Büchel, 
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Engesser, & Esser, 2019; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; Müller et al., 
2017; Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018; Wirth et al., 2016; Wirz et al., 2018).  
We conducted a content analysis of news articles and corresponding reader comments 
during election campaigns in France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We find that 
populist key messages by political and media actors in news articles do not only provoke 
more reader comments but also prompt citizens to use populist key messages themselves in 
their comments – regardless of how journalists contextualize these statements. 
Populist Online Communication 
Connecting approaches in political science and communication science, we conceive of 
populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a “set of ideas” (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 
2018; Taggart, 2000) that can manifest discursively in the communication of political actors, 
media actors, or citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018).  
At the core of populist ideology lies the Manichean juxtaposition of the pure, good 
people to a corrupt, detached elite, as well as the demand that politics should be an expression 
of the unrestrained popular will (Mudde, 2004). Furthermore, populist ideology conceives of 
‘the people’ as a monolithic entity that can have a common will, common desires and 
common interests. Consequentially, specific social groups who do not share the people’s 
“good” characteristics, values, or opinions are perceived as out-groups or as “dangerous 
‘others’” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). While ‘the elite’ is subject to a vertical 
differentiation from ‘the people’, ‘the others’ are the target of a horizontal exclusion (Abts & 
Rummens, 2007). Following this conceptualization, populist ideology consists of four 
dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, and the exclusion of others.  
With regard to the fourth dimension, it is disputed whether the exclusion of others is a 
core element of populist ideology or specific of right-wing populism (see e.g., Engesser, 
Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). Following de Vreese et al. (2018), we argue that the construction of 
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specific out-groups is inherent in populism’s monolithic conception of the people but that not 
all types of populism necessarily exclude a specific social group. 
This populist ideology can be communicated by various actors by means of populist 
key messages. Consequentially, we do not argue that there are populist actors per se but that 
populism is a matter of degree and that anyone can become a ‘populist’ by communicating 
populist key messages (de Vreese et al., 2018). From a political communication perspective, 
three key actors are of particular interest as communicators of populist key messages: 1) 
political actors, 2) the media, and 3) citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018). 
Political actors have been featured most prominently in research on populism. 
Previous research shows that, on the one hand, populist communication is most often used by 
parties at both extremes of the political spectrum, opposition or challenger parties (Ernst et 
al., 2017). On the other hand, politicians of mainstream or moderate parties also rely on 
populist communication to some extent (Blassnig, Ernst, Büchel, & Engesser, 2018). 
Although new media allow politicians to circumvent traditional gatekeepers (Ernst et al., 
2017), political actors are still highly reliant on journalistic media to gain a broad publicity for 
their messages. In turn, due to a high news value and compatibility with media logic, populist 
messages specifically meet the selection criteria of news media (Mazzoleni, 2008). 
This leads to the second actor group of populist communication: the media. Esser, 
Stępińska, and Hopmann (2017) distinguish between populism through the media and 
populism by the media. In brief, from the perspective of populism by the media, the 
communicators of populist messages are the media (i.e., journalists) themselves, whereas 
populism through the media relates to populist messages by political actors that are 
disseminated through the media. Thus, the media can act as originators of populist key 
messages as well as a platform for populist communication by other actors, mostly by 
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political actors. Furthermore, journalists can, of course, also criticize or challenge populist 
messages by political actors (Wettstein et al., 2018). 
Such mediated populist messages by political or media actors are then received by 
citizens – the third actor group (de Vreese et al., 2018). On the one hand, this raises questions 
about the effects of populist communication on citizens (see e.g. Müller et al., 2017). On the 
other hand, citizens can become populist actors themselves. Especially online media allow the 
audience to engage easily with populist content by liking, sharing, or commenting. Thereby, 
citizens themselves can voice populist ideas in reaction to news coverage, which (Esser et al., 
2017) refer to as “populist citizen journalism.” 
The characteristics of online news media, such as the attention economy of the 
Internet, an increasingly commercialized media logic, and a more direct connection to the 
people, may foster populist communication by political actors, the media, and citizens 
(Blassnig et al., 2019). Online, these three actor groups can directly interact, and their 
communication is intertwined within the same platform. Populist key messages by political 
actors are cited and interpreted by the news media, and resonate with citizens as readers who 
like, share, or comment on such messages. 
Online Reader Comments in the Public Sphere 
The ability to directly comment on online news articles allows readers to actively engage with 
the news. In the literature, reader comments are associated both with positive as well as with 
negative developments for the online public sphere. 
From the perspective of the media, high numbers of reader comments generate 
website traffic and contribute to high click rates (Anderson, 2011). Thus, reader comments 
can serve as popularity cues, indicating the attention received or the relevance of an article 
(Bene, 2017; Porten-Cheé, Haßler, Jost, Eilders, & Maurer, 2018). They may raise news 
consumer engagement and loyalty and are, therefore, often desirable from a commercial point 
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of view (e.g., Vujnovic, 2011). Comments may also allow a more reciprocal exchange 
between journalists and their readers (Lewis, Holton, & Coddington, 2013). However, 
problematic aspects, such as incivility or hate speech, present challenges for journalists and 
media organizations (e.g., Coe, Kenski, & Rains, 2014; Stroud, Scacco, Muddiman, & Curry, 
2015).  
For citizens, reader comments provide a public space to interact with news content, 
voice their opinions, learn about other opinions, and debate with others (Ruiz et al., 2011; 
Springer, Engelmann, & Pfaffinger, 2015; Stroud et al., 2015; Ziegele, Quiring, Esau, & 
Friess, 2018). Reader comments can contribute to a deliberative online public sphere, given 
that they adhere to specific standards, such as civility, reciprocity, or openness (Dahlberg, 
2011). From a liberal individualist perspective, comments serve the uninhibited self-
expression, possibly at the expense of deliberative standards (Freelon, 2015).  
From a communitarian perspective, reader comments may serve as a means to 
collaborate with like-minded others to advance specific ideological goals while disengaging 
from outsiders (Freelon, 2015). Additionally, comment sections can constitute counter 
publics, where citizens express opinions that challenge the mainstream media or the perceived 
dominant public sphere (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). Thus, from a participatory point of view, 
encouraging citizens to write comments may raise inclusion and opinion diversity, and 
promote a broader participation in the online public sphere (Ruiz et al., 2011; Toepfl 
& Piwoni, 2015; Weber, 2014; Ziegele et al., 2018). 
However, user comments are often also viewed as an aspect of several problematic 
developments in the online public sphere. Incivility and its effects on the deliberative quality 
of online discussions have been a central concern in previous research (Coe et al., 2014; 
Gervais, 2014; Ziegele et al., 2018). In contrast to counter publics, it has also been argued that 
comments may act as “echo chambers” that reinforce the opinion perceived as dominant 
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within a certain media outlet or social group (Jamieson & Cappella, 2010; Walter, 
Brüggemann, & Engesser, 2016). Several authors have warned that in a high-choice media 
environment, this may lead to increasingly polarized or fragmented audiences (Blumler & 
Kavanagh, 1999; Sunstein, 2002; Van Aelst et al., 2017). However, a growing number of 
recent empirical studies have put this into question (e.g., Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Webster 
& Ksiazek, 2012). 
Several of these aspects may render reader comments particularly prone to populist 
communication (Blassnig et al., 2019). Perceiving comment sections as communitarian 
spaces, counter publics, or echo chambers involves the construction of in- and out-groups, the 
conception of a people with a closed, collective identity, and the use of “us” vs. “them” 
rhetoric, which are all central characteristics of populist communication (Abts & Rummens, 
2007; de Vreese et al., 2018; Mudde, 2004). The role of comments as liberal individualist 
self-expression brings to mind the populists’ self-proclaimed defense of freedom of speech 
and zeal against the ‘political correctness’ of the elites (Moffitt, 2016; Mudde, 2004). 
Additionally, reader comments are subject to less editorial control, norms, and gatekeeping 
processes that may filter out or attenuate populist communication in editorial content 
(Krämer, 2017). 
The Influence of Populism in News Articles on Reader Comments 
Our focus lies on the connection between populism in online news articles and the 
corresponding reader comments. On the one hand, as popularity cues, comments may 
contribute to higher click-rates and circulation of online news articles that contain populism, 
thereby providing a higher reach for these populist messages. On the other hand, the reader 
comments themselves may include and propagate populist statements.  
In general, the characteristics of online news articles influence the level of 
participation in comment sections. Based largely on news value theory, previous research 
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suggests that controversial issues, political or social conflicts, and negative or provocative 
messages (Tenenboim & Cohen, 2014; Ziegele et al., 2018; Ziegele, Breiner, & Quiring, 
2014), certain news factors (Weber, 2014), or a generally high news value (Ziegele et al., 
2018) can increase the number of commenters that respond to an article.  
Populist communication has been described as highly compatible with media logic 
and attributed with a high news value (Mazzoleni, 2008). Populist messages often co-occur 
with a negative, emotionalized, or dramatized communication style (Ernst, Blassnig, 
Engesser, Büchel, & Esser, 2019). Therefore, it can be assumed that the occurrence of 
populist key messages may have a positive impact on the amount of comments an article 
receives. This is also supported by initial empirical evidence that populist content (Blassnig et 
al., forthcoming; Bobba, 2018) and related stylistic devices (Bene, 2017; Heiss, Schmuck, & 
Matthes, 2018) stimulate audience response on social media. 
Based on the literature on effects of populist communication, these findings could be 
explained by different persuasion processes. From the perspective of social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 2004), populist communication invokes specific in-group and out-group 
identities (Hameleers et al., 2017; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 9; Schulz, Wirth, & 
Müller, 2018): the pure people as threatened in-group against the corrupt elites and dangerous 
‘others’ as out-groups (Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2018). This perception of in-group 
deprivation and out-group threat can mobilize people and trigger collective action 
(Hameleers, Bos, Fawzi et al., 2018; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008). Furthermore, populist communication could provoke reactions via emotional 
persuasion processes (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; Wirz, 2018b). Populist messages can be 
explicitly emotional or include characteristics that make them more likely to elicit emotional 
responses through appraisal processes (Wirz, 2018b). Both positive and negative emotions – 
mostly anger, fear, hope, and pride – have been associated with populism, whereas especially 
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anger and hope have been shown to increase the persuasiveness of populist demands (Wirz, 
2018b) and may also increase the willingness to respond to such messages.   
This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1 Articles that contain populist key messages receive higher numbers of reader 
comments. 
a. Articles that contain populist key messages by political speakers receive 
higher numbers of reader comments. 
b. Articles that contain populist key messages by media speakers receive higher 
numbers of reader comments. 
Journalistic content does not only have an impact on how many people comment on 
news articles but also on the content of online discussions (Gervais, 2014; Walter et al., 2016; 
Ziegele et al., 2018). Toepfl and Piwoni (2017) found that the emphasis structure of news 
articles predicts the emphasis frames used in attendant reader comments. Gervais (2014) 
shows that the use of media with higher levels of incivility leads to an increased use of 
incivility in the political expression of citizens. Walter et al. (2016), focusing on the topic of 
climate change, suggest that comment sections function as echo chambers. 
Similarly, we believe that populism in news articles and populism in reader comments 
are related to each other. Krämer (2014) argues that populist communication activates a type 
of “populism schema,” i.e., cognitive schemata that are related to the core dimensions of 
populist ideology. Accordingly, we may assume that populist media content has priming 
effects, making latent populist attitudes of recipients more salient in the short or long term 
(Krämer, 2014). Generally, (media) priming refers to effects of mediated content on people’s 
subsequent judgements or behaviors  (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 
2002). More specifically, priming effects increase the (short-term) accessibility of certain 
concepts in memory, which may then have an increased likelihood of being used in 
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subsequent evaluations (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002). Thus, from the perspective of 
priming, populist communication activates preexisting populist ideas or attitudes in the 
memory of recipients, which means that the user is more likely to use them in judgements or 
evaluations in response to a message. In newspaper articles, populism is usually not presented 
as a thoroughly elaborated ideology, but as a collection of fragments. In this context, schema 
theory assumes that it is often sufficient to highlight one element of a cognitive cluster to 
coactivate other elements of the cognitive cluster (Bartlett & Burt, 1933; Brewer & 
Nakamura, 1984; Iran-Nejad, 1984). Thus, a news article that contains one dimension of 
populist communication may also make other dimensions more salient and, consequently, 
activate populist attitudes in total (Müller et al., 2017). 
Populist ideas may serve as an interpretative framework for various events and can 
therefore also be understood as a frame (Aslanidis, 2015; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018). In 
addition to the priming approach, the cognitive effects of populist communication can also be 
examined with a framing approach. Previous studies have for example argued that populist 
communication affects recipients’ attitudes via value framing (Wirz, 2018a) or blame 
attributions (Hameleers et al., 2017). 
Findings by Müller et al. (2017) suggest that exposure to populist messages in the 
news leads to more populist attitudes, but only for those citizens who already agreed with 
populist ideas beforehand, overall fostering polarization. Similarly, Hameleers and Schmuck 
(2017) found in an experiment that populist messages communicated via social media 
increase populist attitudes only if recipients supported the source of the message. According 
to Wirz et al. (2018), anti-immigrant messages in the media lead to more negative cognitions 
toward immigrants, while populist content in general leads to more negative emotions. 
Therefore, we formulate the second hypothesis, as follows: 
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H2 Comments are more likely to be populist if they respond to an article containing 
populist key messages. 
a. Comments are more likely to be populist if they respond to an article 
containing populist key messages by political speakers. 
b. Comments are more likely to be populist if they respond to an article 
containing populist key messages by media speakers. 
The question arises whether this effect depends on how the media contextualize 
populist statements. The media may convey populist key messages by politicians in different 
ways. In addition to being originators of populist messages and gatekeepers for populist 
statements by political actors, the media may also interpret populist actors or ideas in their 
coverage and evaluate them positively or negatively (Esser et al., 2017; Wettstein et al., 
2018). The media may neutrally disseminate populist key messages, attenuate or criticize 
them, or support, legitimize or reinforce them (Blassnig et al., 2019), and this may also 
influence the effect that they have on readers and their comments. Thus, how journalists 
transmit and interpret populist key messages may influence how citizens react to such articles 
in reader comments. Therefore, we formulate an additional open research question, as 
follows: 
RQ1 Does the contextualization of populist key messages in news articles have an 
influence on the use of populist communication in reader comments? 
Method 
We conducted a quantitative content analysis of reader comments and the respective news 
articles during election campaigns in France (2017), Switzerland (2015), and the United 





In the selection of the countries, we followed a most different systems within most similar 
systems design. On the one hand, we selected countries that have similar political, economic, 
and cultural settings within Western Europe. In addition, in all three countries (right-wing), 
populist parties were rather successful in the last European or national elections and have 
similar positions with regard to migration policy and EU integration. On the other hand, 
France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom differ distinctly with regard to their types of 
political systems and media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Lijphart, 1999). This allows to 
investigate the relation between populism in articles and reader comments in varying contexts 
and enables a higher generalizability of our findings within Western Europe (Esser & 
Vliegenthart, 2017). 
The investigation period covers the six weeks before the most recent, regular national 
elections in the three countries. For the United Kingdom, we included the national 
parliamentary elections on May 7, 2015, for Switzerland, the national parliamentary elections 
on October 18, 2015, and for France, the presidential elections, with the first round occurring 
on April 23 and the second round on May 7, 2017. Election campaigns offer themselves as an 
inquiry period to investigate populist communication and reader comments, as they provide a 
pointed view of a country’s political communication culture (Esser & Strömbäck, 2012) as 
well as a particularly contested environment in which populism is most likely to manifest 
itself (Plasser & Ulram, 2003). As populism is a rare and fragmented phenomenon in the 
overall news media coverage, the identification of a political issue that is affine to populism 
and has the potential of higher levels of populist messages was crucial (Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, 
& Engesser, 2018). We focused on the populism affine topic of immigration because this 
topic is a polarized and conflict-laden issue and is particularly prone to right-wing populist 
rhetoric (Taggart, 2017). Recent comparative studies conducting qualitative interviews have 
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found that journalists and politicians across several European countries see the topic of 
immigration as one of the most important drivers of populism (Salgado et al., 2019; Stanyer et 
al., 2019). Additionally, content analyses across European countries found that immigration 
was the most commented on topic in print news and among the topics that showed the highest 
share of populist messages (Ernst et al., 2018; Esser et al., 2019). Consequently, immigration 
is a highly important topic that is similarly relevant across the three investigated countries. It 
poses a particular challenge to responsible media coverage and may be specifically vulnerable 
to populist reader comments (Sheets et al., 2016). 
We incorporate five online news outlets per country, comprising print-parent, TV-
parent, and pure online outlets (see Table 1). For each country, we included the online outlets 
of two leading upmarket daily newspapers, the dominant mass-market daily paper, one TV-
parent outlet, and the most important pure online outlet in each country. 
Table 1: Online news outlets 
  
  Country 
  France Switzerland UK 
Print-parent 
Up-market 
Lefigaro.fr Nzz.ch Telegraph.co.uk 
Lemonde.fr Tagesanzeiger.ch Theguardian.com 
Mass-market Leparisien.fr Blick.ch dailymail.co.uk 
TV-parent Public Info.france2.fr Srf.ch Bbc.co.uk 






To sample the relevant online news material, we followed a user-based sampling 
approach, placing the user perspective at the center and incorporating search strategies that 
are common in the everyday practice of the average Internet user. In this way, the sample is 
less representative of the overall population of news articles but more representative of the 
population that the users are actually confronted with. We relied on Google to search the 
specific news websites, using the same web browser (Google Chrome) in the “incognito” 
browsing mode for all searches and disabling the search history to ensure comparability and 
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replicability. To ensure that the sampled articles related to the topic of immigration as well as 
to domestic politics, we used an immigration search string that additionally contained 
commonly used abbreviations or labels for four selected parties per country.1  
For each news outlet, we then googled the search string translated into the respective 
language, restricted the search to the respective news website (site:website.com) and the time 
frame to the selected six weeks, and downloaded the first 30 listed news items (the first three 
pages). This yielded n = 433 news article of which n = 332 received at least one comment. For 
these articles, we sampled the first ten reader comments – , i.e., the first ten comments, 
chronologically, that were posted in direct response to the article.2 The final sample comprises 
332 articles and 2786 reader comments. 
Operationalization and Coding Procedure 
Populist key messages. We regard populist communication as a formative measure 
(Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 2008) based on the four dimensions and corresponding 
twelve populist key messages (see Table 2). The key messages were operationalized as 
dummy variables based on Cranmer (2011), Jagers and Walgrave (2007), and Wirth et al. 
(2016). For each category, we coded at the story level whether a given populist key message 
was present in an article or comment.  
Speaker. For each populist key message, we coded whether the speaker was a political actor, a 
media actor, or a citizen. Populist statements by other actors were not incorporated in the 
analysis. A political speaker was a political actor who was quoted in the story either directly 
or indirectly. If the journalist herself made a populist statement, the speaker was coded as a 
media actor. For reader comments, the speaker was coded as citizen (except if the commenter 




Table 2: Operationalization of populist communication 
Dimension Populist key message Description 
People-Centrism 
Approaching the people 
The speaker describes himself or is described as belonging to the people, being close to the people, knowing the 
people, speaking for the people, caring for the people, agreeing with the people or performing everyday actions. 
The speaker claims to represent or embody the people. 
Praising the people’s virtues 
The people are attributed with positive traits such as morality, charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, 
consistency, etc. The people are exempt from being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, racist, 
undemocratic, etc. 
Praising the people’s achievements 
The people are described as being responsible for a positive development/situation, an achievement or benefit. 
Achievements include important, successful, ‘right’ actions or other accomplishments. 
Describing the people as 
homogenous 
The people are described as sharing a common understanding of the world, common feelings, desires, opinions, 
or a common will. 
Anti-Elitism 
Discrediting the elite 
Negative personality traits, mistakes, and unlawful or immoral behavior of the elites are stressed. The elites are 
portrayed as corrupt, malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, evil, undemocratic, etc. The elite are called 
names and denied morality, charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, consistency, etc. 
Blaming the elite 
Elites are described as a threat/burden, or held responsible for negative developments/situations, specific failures, 
or as having committed specific mistakes or crimes.  
Detaching the elite from the people 
Elites are described as not belonging to the people, not being close to the people, not knowing the people, not 
speaking for the people, not caring for the people, or not performing everyday actions. 
Sovereignty 
Demanding popular sovereignty 
The speaker argues for general institutional reforms to grant the people more power by introducing direct-
democratic elements or increasing political participation. The speaker argues in favor of granting more power to 
the people within the context of a specific issue (e.g., election, immigration, security). 
Denying elite sovereignty 
The speaker argues in favor of granting less power to elites within the context of a specific issue (e.g., election, 
immigration, security). 
Exclusion 
Discrediting specific groups  
Specific social groups or population segments are discredited, denounced, or stigmatized. They are portrayed as 
evil, criminal, lazy, stupid, immoral, dangerous, etc. 
Blaming specific groups 
Specific social groups or population segments are held responsible for a negative, undesirable or harmful 
development/situation. They are described as not being responsible for a positive development or situation. 
Excluding specific groups 
Specific societal groups or population segments are characterized as ‘others’, juxtaposed to ‘the people’, 





Populism indices were calculated for the three speaker types, which were present if at 
least one of the twelve populist key messages was used in a story or comment by the 
respective speaker type. 
Contextualization. In the event that there was a populist key message in a news story, we 
coded whether the author (i) disseminated the message neutrally, (ii) explicitly attenuated or 
criticized the message, (iii) provided a favorable context for the message that supported, 
reinforced, or legitimized it, or (iv) whether the author voiced populist key messages himself. 
A team of ten intensively trained student coders had to pass several pretests as well as 
the final reliability test based on English-language material (31 online news articles and 30 
reader comments, n = 61) and reached acceptable levels of reliability. The average Brennan 
and Prediger’s K cross all populist key messages was .75. For the two speaker types (political 
speaker and media speaker), Brennan and Prediger’s K was .79, and the contextualization 
displayed a Brennan and Prediger’s K of .82 (see Table A in the online appendix). 
Analysis 
Depending on the specificities of the data and dependent variables, we employed different 
types of regression methods to answer the hypotheses. H1a and H1b were tested using 
negative binomial regression. This accounts for the right-skewed and overdispersed 
distribution of the count of comments per article, which served as the dependent variable. To 
test H2a and H2b and answer RQ1, we conducted multilevel regression models containing 
fixed-effects components to account for the fact that reader comments are nested within the 
articles they respond to. 
Findings 





key message in 65 percent (n = 214) of the news articles analyzed. In 61 percent of these 
cases (n = 131), the journalists conveyed a populist message that originally came from a 
politician; and in 37 percent (n = 79), the journalists made their own populist statement. In 
terms of dimensions, journalists most often included anti-elitist messages in their stories 
(55%, n = 181). Less often, they used or cited messages related to people-centrism (22%, n = 
72), exclusionism (11%, n = 35) or sovereignty (5%, n = 15). The articles received, on 
average, 272.48 comments (MIN = 1, MAX = 3997, SD = 601.67). Citizens voiced at least one 
populist key message in approximately a third (34%, n = 951) of all analyzed reader 
comments. Similar to the politicians and journalists, the citizens most often used anti-elitist 
key messages (28%, n = 786) and less often expressed key messages related to people-
centrism (3%, n = 96), exclusion (3%, n = 94), or sovereignty (1%, n = 32).iii 
Table 3: The influence of populist communication in articles on the total number of comments 
    Number of Comments   
IRR CI 
 (Intercept) 61.46*** [45.87, 82.35] 
Country
a 
United Kingdom 8.76*** [5.84, 13.16] 
France 1.41* [1.01, 1.99] 
Outlet
b 
Mass-market 0.50*** [0.33, 0.74] 
Pure online 0.24*** [0.16, 0.35] 
Article 
Populism by Political Speaker 2.28*** [1.68, 3.09] 
Populism by Media Speaker 1.80*** [1.29, 2.51] 
AIC 3863.81 
Log likelihood -1923.91 
Omnibus-test  236.82*** (df = 6) 
Note: Negative binomial regression predicting the total number of comments in response to the articles (N 
= 332). IRRs with confidence intervals in brackets. Values < 1 indicate a negative effect; values > 1 
indicate a positive effect. AIC = Akaike information criterion, IRR = incidence rate ratios, CI = confidence 
interval. 
a 
Switzerland was set as baseline category. 
b 
Up-market was set as baseline category.  
*
p < .05, 
**
p < .01, 
***







Hypothesis 1 postulated a positive relationship between populist key messages in 
articles and the total number of comments they receive in return. A negative binomial 
regression controlling for differences between countries and outlet types (see Table 3), shows 
that, as expected, populist communication by political speakers as well as by media speakers 
in articles is positively and significantly associated with higher numbers of comments. For the 
interpretation of the results, we focus on the incidence rate ratios (IRR), which correspond to 
exponential b-coefficients. Values higher than 1 indicate a positive influence, and values 
below 1 indicate a negative influence on the number of reader comments an article receives. 
More precisely, when the independent variable is present (in the case of dummy variables), 
the expected count of reader comments has to be multiplied by the IRR (Trilling, Tolochko, & 
Burscher, 2016). This suggests that articles in which journalists include populist statements by 
political actors trigger 2.28 times more reader comments, and articles in which journalists 
make their own populist statements drive up the number of reader comments by a factor of 
1.80. This supports both H1a and H1b. 
Observing the control variables, we see that news articles in Great Britain and France 
receive more reader comments overall than Swiss articles do and that readers of mass-market 
and pure online news websites comment less than readers of upmarket outlets. 
To test hypotheses H2a and H2b and answer RQ1, we conducted four multilevel 
models (see Table 4) with maximum-likelihood estimation (ML). The dependent variable in 
all four models is populist communication by citizens in reader comments, which indicates 
whether the commenter uses at least one populist key message. The units of analysis are 
reader comments, which are nested in the articles they respond to. Hence, the independent 
variables – source of the message (from the journalist himself or from a political source) and 
contextualization of the message (neutral transmission, negative attenuation or positive 





variable is located at the first level. Additionally, we controlled for the length of a comment at 
the first level and for differences between types of outlets at the second level.iv 
In a first step, we assessed whether it is useful to apply a multilevel model. If we 
compare the intercept-only model (Model 1) with the baseline model (χ2(2) = 19.81, p < 
.001), we can conclude that the intercepts vary significantly across articles and significantly 
improved the model fit. In a second step, we added fixed-effects for the control variables 
(Model 2). As we can see in Table 4, the length of the reader comment has a significant 
impact on whether its author includes a populist message. It is relatively obvious that the 
longer a comment is, the more likely it is that it contains populist communication. The type of 
the outlet, however, does not have any significant influence on the amount of populism in 
reader comments. Thus, no differences can be found between upmarket, mass-market, or pure 
online outlets. A model comparison demonstrated that the model fit significantly increased for 
model 2 (χ2(1) = 128.87, p < .001).  
Hypotheses H2a and H2b predicted that populist communication by political speakers 
as well as by media speakers would increase the probability that citizens respond with 
populist key messages in their comments as well. To test these hypotheses, we added two 
fixed effects for populist communication by political speakers (dummy) and populist 
communication by media speakers (dummy) to the model. Again, a model comparison 
revealed that the model fit improves for model 3 (χ2(1) = 18.42, p < .001). We find clear 
support for both subhypotheses. Populist communication by political speakers (β = 0.086, 
t(326) = 3.88, p < .001) and by media speakers (β = 0.051, t(326) = 2.37, p < .05) significantly 
predict populist reactions in reader comments. On online news sites, citizens thus felt 







Table 4: Multi-level models predicting populist communication in reader comments 
  Populist Reader Comments 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) β (SE) 
(Intercept) -0.001 (0.022) -0.001  (0.021) -0.00 (0.021) -0.00 (0.021) 
Length of 
comment 
  0.216***  (0.019) 0.219*** (0.019) 0.217*** (0.020) 
Mass-market 
outlet 
  -0.017 (0.022) -0.032 (0.023) -0.034 (0.023) 
Pure online outlet   -0.042 (0.022) -0.039 (0.022) -0.041  (0.022) 
Populism by 
Political Speaker 
     0.086*** (0.022) 0.083*** (0.022) 
Populism by 
Media Speaker 
     0.051* (0.022)   
Attenuation       0.017  (0.022) 
Amplification       0.036  (0.021) 
AIC 7891.51 7768.64 7754.22 7758.61 
BIC 7909.30 7804.23 7801.68 7812.01 
Log Likelihood -3842.75 -3878.32 -3869.11 -3870.31 
Level 1 N 
(Comments) 
2786 2786 2786 2786 
Level 2 N 
(Articles) 
331 331 331 331 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Finally, RQ1 asked whether the contextualization of populist key messages by 
journalists might have an influence on the amount of populism in reader comments. To 
answer this question, we have added fixed effects to the model for whether journalists have 
either muted or strengthened (attenuated or amplified) populist statements by politicians. 
Since we regarded it also as amplification if the journalists themselves acted as the originators 
of populist key messages, model 4 does not include populism by media speakers as an 
independent variable. A model comparison showed that adding these variables does not 
improve the model fit (χ2(1) = 2.40, n.s.). Additionally, when we look at model 4, neither 
attenuation nor amplification have a significant effect on populism in reader comments, while 
populist communication by political speakers remains a significant factor (β = 0.083, t(325) = 





comments regardless of whether these messages are attenuated, amplified, or transmitted 
neutrally by the media. For readers who operate with populist arguments, the interpretation 
and embedding by the journalist is largely irrelevant; such readers mainly focus on statements 
by politicians. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article set out to investigate how populism in the media affects the media users. 
Specifically, we analyzed the influence of populist statements by political and media actors in 
news articles on immigration on the number and content of reader comments during election 
periods in France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Our findings suggest that populism 
in articles leads to more frequent and more populist reader comments. These effects may be 
explained by several causal mechanisms such as priming, framing, or emotional persuasion 
processes. Thus, populist messages in online news articles seem to hit a nerve with the readers 
by activating populist attitudes, in-group and out-group identifications, or eliciting emotions 
that prompt them to comment more and in a more populist manner.  
Populism seems to generate more attention among readers and encourage citizens to 
engage in online discussions. As discussed above, this may be explained by populism’s news 
value, its ability to mobilize citizens by activating in-group and out-group identifications, or 
emotional persuasion processes. On the one hand, this can be seen as desirable from a 
participatory viewpoint, if populist communication raises participation and possibly opinion 
diversity in the online public sphere. On the other hand, this may also help to propagate the 
populist key messages in the articles, which may be regarded as problematic from the 
perspective of liberal democracy, as we will elaborate below. In both cases, if populism 
generates a high user response, it may be beneficial from a commercial viewpoint for the 





Whether reader comments can be considered desirable, of course, depends on their 
content. In this regard, our results imply that populism in the news may incite more populist 
content by readers and, thus, foster a proliferation of populist ideas. In line with our 
theoretical expectations based on schema theory and similar argumentation by Müller et al. 
(2017), populist key messages in the news seem to have priming effects on citizens that 
activate a populism schema and prompt them to use such populist elements themselves in 
their responding reader comments.  
Furthermore, it does not seem to matter whether journalists moderate populist 
messages by political actors or not. Neutrally transmitted populist key messages lead just as 
much to more populism in reader comments as attenuated or amplified populist statements do. 
This would imply that simply reporting on populist actors and their statements is sufficient to 
activate populist commenters. However, we only coded for explicit attenuation or 
amplification by journalists. Future research should include a more fine-grained measurement 
of moderation that includes any type of challenge or support for populist statements to 
conclusively answer this question, especially since other research suggests that populist 
statements are more often challenged by journalists, at least in print news (Wettstein et al., 
2018). 
If reader comments contribute to the dissemination of populist communication in the 
online public sphere, this can be regarded as problematic from the perspective of liberal 
democracy. While some scholars regard populism as an inherent feature of a democratic 
system (Canovan, 1999; Mény & Surel, 2002), it is more often described as a threat, as 
populism undermines central aspects of liberal democracy (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Taggart, 
2000) and may negatively impact political communication (Waisbord, 2018). However, if a 
reader comment is populist, this does not necessarily mean that it is uncivil or impolite. In 





considered as deliberative. Thus, citizens may also formulate legitimate criticism in a populist 
way. Additionally, as our data shows, exclusionist key messages, which are most closely 
linked to extreme right-wing or racist statements, are rather rare. Much more common is an 
anti-elitist rhetoric, mostly against the political establishment. First, this may have to do with 
the fact that media outlets may delete openly racist or discriminating comments. Second, 
during election campaigns, citizens may be specifically prone to voice their discontent with 
the political elite. 
Some additional limitations need to be considered. First, although our study is 
comparative across three countries and different types of media outlets, the scope of our 
sample is limited. Thus, the found effects would need to be replicated in other countries, 
specifically with regard to non-Western or non-European countries. Additionally, with our 
focus on elections and the topic of immigration, we study populism under most-likely 
conditions. Populism in news articles as well as in reader comments may additionally be 
fueled by the polarized context of elections as well as by the controversial and populism-
affine topic. Consequentially, the results can be generalized to other issues only with caution. 
Based on other recent studies (Ernst et al., 2018), we would expect the overall levels of 
populism in news articles to be lower for less populism-affine issues and therefore also the 
effects on reader comments to be weaker. Nevertheless, we believe that the high importance 
and prevalence of immigration in current political news renders our results specifically 
relevant for populist communication. Second, our sampling procedure leads to additional 
limitations. Since we only sample the first ten reader comments that directly respond to the 
articles, our findings may not apply to comment sections overall. However, existing research 
shows that not only the articles but also previous comments may influence if and how readers 
formulate subsequent comments (Zerback & Fawzi, 2016; Ziegele et al., 2014; Ziegele, 





influenced less by the subsequent reader comments and more directly a response to the 
original article. On the other hand, primacy effect research lets us expect that the first ten 
reader comments receive the most attention from other users (e.g., Anderson, 1965). 
Consequently, they may substantially influence subsequent reader comments and 
disproportionally steer the direction of the discussion in the comment section. Third, we do 
not know how the respective media outlets moderate their comment sections. Thus, the 
criteria for deleting comments are unclear and the comment function may be blocked entirely 
for certain articles. This could influence our results if populist communication was 
systematically related to being deleted by journalistic moderators. This is conceivable since 
populist communication is often associated with taboo-breaking and controversial language 
and the media outlets would probably delete reader comments that contain uncivil anti-elitist 
attacks or racist exclusionist statements. If this were the case, our results would rather 
underestimate the effects. Fourth, we did not code for other substantive characteristics of 
reader comments, such as incivility or deliberativeness. For future studies, it would be 
interesting to investigate how they relate to populist communication in reader comments. 
Finally, relying solely on content analysis of digital trace data has certain limits. For one 
thing, we cannot control for citizens’ attitudes, sociodemographic characteristics or political 
opinions. Only a small share of online news readers actually use the comment function; 
hence, reader comments are not representative of public opinion (Springer et al., 2015; Walter 
et al., 2016). Thus, our findings may only apply to a specific group of people who are 
particularly prone to comment on news articles as one of the first commenters. Nevertheless, 
we believe that these comments are relevant as they may also influence attitudes, opinions, or 
perceptions of public opinion of inactive observers that only read comment sections without 
commenting themselves (Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010; Zerback & Fawzi, 2016). Moreover, 





priming effects, we cannot effectively determine which underlying cognitive or affective 
processes explain these effects best. This is a disadvantage in comparison to experimental 
settings in exchange for the higher validity of digital trace data. Future research can determine 
which theoretical model fits best. 
Overall, our study demonstrates that (1) populist key messages resonate with citizens 
and are disseminated by them (populism resonates); (2) populist key messages lead to more 
populist key messages (populism multiplies); and (3) we find that, at least in our case, 
journalistic contextualization does not matter significantly. With the continuing rise of 
populist political actors in several countries, such as France, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom, specifically on the right side of the political spectrum, the media is repeatedly 
confronted with the question of how to cover such populist actors and issues. Although other 
recent studies suggest that the media often challenge populist actors and their statements 
(Wettstein et al., 2018), our results imply that even the attenuation of populist messages by 
media speakers does not lead to a reduced number of populist reader comments. While a high 
participation in the online public sphere is desirable, high levels of populism may have 
negative consequences for political communication in liberal democracies. Therefore, we 
need more research on how citizens react and contribute to online populist communication. 
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1Notes 
1 The search strings for the three different countries were as follows: 
CH: migration OR immigration OR zuwanderung OR flüchtling OR ausländer OR asyl OR 
einbürgerung OR ausschaffung "SVP" OR "SP" OR "Lega" OR "FDP" 
UK: migration OR immigration OR refugee OR foreigner OR asylum OR naturalisation OR 
deportation Labour OR "Scottish National Party" OR SNP OR "Liberal Democrats" OR 
"Lib Dems" 
FR: migration OR immigration OR réfugié OR étranger OR asile OR naturalisation OR expuls 
OR reconduite "Front National" OR "FN" OR "Parti socialiste" OR "PS" OR "Corsica 
Libera" OR "Parti libéral démocrate" OR "PLD" 
2 For those news outlets where it was not possible to change the order of the reader comments (Le 
Figaro, Le Monde, Le Parisien, Rue89, Blick, SRF, Watson), the ten newest reader comments 
were selected for the sample. 
iii An overview of descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Tables C and D in the online 
appendix.  
iv As additional robustness checks, we ran the multi-level models with the three countries as well as 
with the 16 news outlets as additional random effects on the third level of the models. Either 
way, we could replicate the same results for all four models. However, since the inclusion of a 
third level did not improve model fit, we preferred the presented models with two levels. 
                                                 
